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FALLACIES ASSOCIATED WITH "BOTTOMUP" MANAGEMENT: LESSONS LEARNED
FROM A TIER 5 NEP-Management of the resource base in modern America is undergoing
two parallel and potentially conflicting paradigm shifts from traditional precedent. On one
hand there have been a cry and demand for
public participation and particularly "stakeholders" as in the concept of "comanagement." The pressure has evolved because conflicting uses for ever more limited resources
have become more prevalent. The coastal zone
is a particularly sensitive area since the land
under and resources within coastal zone waters
have largely been found to belong within the
public trust (Slade et aL, 1997). In earlier and
richer times there had been a simple process
of allocation practiced by the government because there were relatively abundant resources.
It didn't take an enormous amount of information or "intelligence" to reach decisions
and people were largely compensated adequately for the effort that they were willing and
able to make.
On the other hand, population growth and
demographic changes, particularly in the
coastal zone, have been coupled with an economic approach driven by the requirement for
an ever-growing Gross National Product. The
fact that negative impact thresholds have already been crossed in some coastal areas is unquestioned (Kildow, 1997), and the subsequent
complexity of blending science, technology, sociology, economy, and politics is currently unparalleled in our nation. Hardin (1968) first
elucidated the problems associated with allocation of commonly owned resources. Crance
and Draper (1996) have summarized the interaction of social dilemma theory with resource
management issues. The dilemma takes the
form of conflicting interests between individual and collective well-being. They contrast
structural solutions, involving some form of coercion or restriction, with behavioral solutions,
involving human behavior modification-both
having the effect of reducing the social dilemma created by resource demand/ conflict.
Structural solutions are clearly equated with
what is referred to as "top-down" management, which has worked successfully for many
decades and must certainly remain part of
management strategies for the foreseeable fu-
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ture. But expanded regulation is increasingly
unpopular, perhaps properly so.
Stakeholder involvement is the current conventional wisdom (and cliche) for bringing together diverse interests. It is viewed as a collaborative process, requiring identification and
engagement of groups previously excluded for
a variety of reasons and the participation of
traditional antagonists. To some extent, this
process was initiated and institutionalized by
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)
passed in 1972, and the agencies have embraced the application of the legislation to
varying degrees (Gray and Kusel, 1998). This
has become an extraordinarily complex process because participation in the advisory committees is perceived as providing significant
control over decisions to be made, as opposed
to the provision of advice to decision makers.
This active inclusion of user communities
has enormous significance because it now appears that the sociological obstacles may equal
or exceed the technical environmental difficulties in enormity. Economic ecology, ecophilosophy, environmental ethics, law and politics,
and even morality are the forums of the future
for environmental scientists, and the intellectual challenges are immense. It seems likely
that changing our ideas and policies dealing
with environmental management may take
more effort and time than that normally seen
in the environment itself-cynics might say,
even in geological time! A most elegant discussion of the technical issues is provided by Fairweather (1993) in a consideration of erecting
the precautionary p1inciple as a policy directive
for the Australian coastal zone.
The precautionary principle is almost totally
absent from American policy, although it may
emerge if the policy trend of all-inclusive stakeholder involvement continues for reasons
presented below. This evolving legal principle
has developed within the European community, particularly Germany, where most tangible
resources have become, to some degree, limited. More important, this situation became
widely recognized decades ago and sociopolitical "evolution" has occurred as demonstrated by the Green Party. The principle, as applied, attempts to reverse the burden of proof
with regard to environmental impact. Instead
of assuming that the natural system has adequate assimilative capacity with regard to some
demand (e.g., habitat loss or pollutant detoxi-
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fication), the principle demands that the user
prove that it has that ability. Under the American permitting system, which has been dealing
with a largesse of capacity for almost 200 years,
the burden of proof lies with those concerned
about the environment. This means that the
permit will be granted unless harm can be legally demonstrated. The Precautionary Principle would demand that environmental safety
be proven before the action would be allowed.
While this may sound appealing, there are
serious concerns with the application of the
principle as summarized by Gray (1990). The
point is simple because the variability inherent
to the environment may confound proving just
about anything. The uncertainty that is actively
incorporated into the scientific method further undermines the public's confidence in
the technocracy that supports the decision
making and allocation process.
That lack of confidence is one of the most
serious problems that we have to deal with at
this time. The general public most frequently
does not trust the bureaucracy, particularly
when environmental decisions are made. The
permitting agencies are perceived by much of
the public as exactly that-created to grant
permits! And frankly, the policies based on assimilative capacity and presumption of "no
harm until demonstrated" support that contention more often than not! The problem is
exacerbated by yet another interesting social
theory which has also emerged in Germany.
Ulrich Beck (1992) has advanced a theory
dealing most directly with hazardous technology, which is referred to as the risk society thesis.
In this country the hazards are represented
most clearly by toxic chemical manufacture
and release. These are products of a relatively
modern and "developed" nation in which the
standard of living is relatively high on a global
scale. The societies of these robust economies
have progressed beyond the status of being
principally engrossed with obtaining enough
food to survive. When you are hungry enough,
you take certain risks, physically or economically, in an effort to assuage that primal need.
Once achieved, however, the risk society
shifts to the next highest motivational level of
survival, which is fear of external harm. Personal concerns may be manifested by concern
about crime, political extremism, racial bias,
climate change, or meteor showers. The popular press and electronic media are full of
these messages: real, perceived, and completely imagined. The technical community has designed an elaborate and arcane system of risk
assessment which is specifically intended to
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deal with the burgeoning concerns of the public but which is clearly understood by almost
no one.
Environmental concerns are abundant, as
in: Is it safe to swim in the water? Can I eat the
food without getting sick because of either assimilated or deliberately applied toxins? Cohen
(1997) attempted to reconcile Beck's thesis
with that of joseph Huber which is referred to
as ecological modernization. That approach requires a commitment to the concept of sustainability, an adoption to some degree of the precautionary principle, and a continued commitment to strict environmental regulation. This
relatively optimistic viewpoint most closely resembles the thesis rejected by Hardin (1968)
because it advances the belief that advanced
technology can solve the problems that it creates. Even without that qualification, it should
be noted that, although sustainable development is attracting some interest in this country,
the precautionary principle and "top-down"
management are not! The cautious approach
is not going to be invoked until we achieve the
same level of enlightened "fear" as the European community and the regulatory approach
is increasingly unpopular in our political climate.
Interestingly enough, the community
around Mobile Bay has begun to evidence
symptoms of a society that Cohen (1997) clearly describes as being in a transition state. The
potential is there to become either a risk society, motivated by fear, or an ecologically modern society guided by reason and planning. Local concerns about inadequate Best Management Practices on construction sites and zoning debates reflect a growing local awareness
that could go in either direction.
NATIONAL ESTUARY PROGRAl\1

The management model that typifies the
modern approach to coastal issues is a consequence of the passage of the Water Quality Act
of 1987-the National Estuary Program. The
structures emerged from years of experimentation and investment of public money in the
problems of Chesapeake Bay. The model consists of a Management Conference composed
of a high-level Policy Committee, guided by
Citizens' and Technical Advisory Committees,
complemented by an implementing group referred to as the Management Committee (EPA,
1989). Ideally, the role of the two advisory
groups provides that emerging public participation imperative in the form of advice, outreach, and consensus building. The approach
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has been largely successful given the eminent
logic of comprehensive planning, the emergence of adaptive management (Colt, 1994;
Hennessey, 1994; McLain and Lee, 1996), and
the infusion of about $5 million over more
than 5 yr for each program.
The terminology may reflect one of the first
inherent flaws of the protocol, however, because there may be an early polarization separating the "citizens" from the "technicians."
This reinforces the lack of confidence in technology felt by the public (as described above)
because of the technical community's partially
failing coastal policy of assimilative capacity.
The EPA has openly acknowledged that the
policy of national standards and permitting is
flawed, saying that many environmental declines "would not be reversed even with perfect compliance with all environmental laws
and regulations" (EPA, 1997:1) The structural
separation of the two sectors is also interesting
in that it implies that not only are citizens not
scientists but also that the technicians are
somehow not citizens. Both attitudes place the
development interests, which are obviously
committed to the existing approach to permitting, on the defensive, thus worsening the polarization.
GULF OF MEXICO PROGRAM
The most explicit movement away from the
Chesapeake/NEP model emerged during areorganization of one of the EPA's own efforts
(Gulf of Mexico Program, 1997). New leadership examined the existing structure and
moved to eliminate the distinction between the
two advisory committees. While retaining the
Policy and Management Committees, "citizens" and technicians were united within "Focus Teams," which concentrate on selected issues. The approach organized the scheme
around strategic, tactical, and operational concepts.
The approach clearly attacks the flaws and
artificial separation of the original construct,
enhancing communication between the two
"classes." The technical community is placed
in a position of hearing and debating the concerns, perceived or real, of the general public.
The citizen is afforded the opportunity to both
question the assumptions of the scientist and
better understand the technical foundation of
that professional position. The potential for
this approach to work was evidenced during
local meetings in the Mobile Bay region in late
1994. Issue-oriented public meetings orchestrated by the South Alabama Regional Plan-
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ning Commission successfully combined "citizen" interests with the technical community. A
structure virtually identical to that espoused by
the NEP approach had been constructed with
a view toward building a comprehensive management plan for the Bay.
MOBILE BAY NEP CAsE STUDY
On 27 Dec. 1994, the Federal Register contained the EPA call for nominations to the National Estuary Program. These were referred
to as Tier 5 NEPs. The call contained the explicit requirement that "EPA will give preference to nominations that describe actions underway ... " (EPA, 1994, 59:31816). The Mobile Bay community responded with a successful nomination and Mobile Bay was so
designated in late summer 1995.
Unfortunately, this timing coincided with
the collapse of the federal funding process and
there was no real progress until 1996. At that
time Region 4 representatives met with the
nominators and described the process to be
followed as described in the estuary primer
(EPA, 1989). This approach seemed to be ignorant of the implications of the Tier 5 definition established in the Federal Register. The
subsequent re-creation of the already existing
structures, as required in the call for nominations, created profound problems for those
who had been participating for over a year.
Many expressed significant frustration and
abandoned the process altogether, writing the
effort off to bureaucracy run amok.
The next debilitating factor to emerge was
an overwhelming commitment to a complete
"stakeholderdom" throughout the management structure. Policy was to be developed by
every involved interest, management was to be
provided by all concerned, and last, but not
least, advice and community consensus was to
be garnered from the stereotypical Citizens
and Technical Advisory Committees. Given the
alienation and subsequent flight of the bulk of
these last two groups, the Mobile Bay NEP took
on the look of an upside-down pyramid since
the Policy Committee and Management Committee were each 32 members strong, in direct
contrast to most of the earlier NEPs! The organizational lines have been further blurred
within the Mobile Bay NEP because each member of the Policy Committee initially appointed
a "representative" to the Management Committee, effectively creating a surrogate policy
committee. Later, specific stakeholder groups
were identified for each named member and
a few were added where deemed appropriate
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or when someone felt they had been left out
of the process.
Part of the problem lies in the laudable, but
possibly misguided, commitment to achieving
consensus among stakeholders at every level.
The original concept provided the opportunity
for examination of issues at the lowest, most
inclusive levels, with programs recommended
to the policy group for implementation by the
management entity. The redundancy of consensus review has led to rancorous debate and
continued frustration within the community.
Progress has been achieved through a partial
movement toward efficiency. The Mobile Bay
NEP has developed issue-oriented task forces
identical with the focus teams of the Gulf of
Mexico program. This has had all the benefits
attendant to that approach and brought the
program much closer to a true "bottom-up"
format. The Citizens and Technical Advisory
Committee members have come to the table
together to develop action plans which will become the management plan itself.
Unfortunately, the Policy and Management
Committees have not yet found a way to
streamline their activities. A persistent "topdown" philosophy continues to pervade the
upper echelon of the Management Conference, confounding the entire process and
jeopardizing the eventual successful implementation of the Comprehensive Conservation
Management Plan.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The true engagement of the public in decisions regarding resources of common value
seems to be an inarguable position of great
weight, a "no-brainer" in the vernacular of the
day. But the rather mindless approach pursued
by the EPA in constructing the Tier 5 Mobile
Bay NEP flies in the face of sincere "bottomup" management. The construct has been and
remains a clumsy paean to democracy in its
purest form overwhelmed by a continued insistence on thoughtless adherence to what has
been.
The role of advisory committees must be
clearly defined by the policy statements and
then honestly respected and used in decision
making and implementation. Repeated revisiting of issues and solutions by an unending sequence of stakeholders is counterproductive at
best and debilitating or destructive at worst.
The Policy component must be established
from the outset as the source of policy and not
routine management. This group must be prepared to interact at the strategic level and leave
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development of consensus to the broadest
spectrum of stakeholding participants. This
level must include all users, consumers, protectors, people who really don't much care at all,
and even scientists. The exchange of information, technical and emotional, can only assist
the process. Implementation by the management entities will succeed only if the affected
groups have confidence in the planners and
eventual success of the planning effort overall.
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